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TOM PAINE'S CONSTITUTION
Robin West*
INTRODUCTION
N Common Sense, our brief for the American Revolution, the
pamphleteer Tom Paine famously declared that "in America the
law is king."' We have been repeating the sentiment in patriotic
and legalistic ceremony ever since. Surprisingly little attention has
been devoted in either constitutional scholarship or jurisprudence,
however, to what Paine might have meant by this, beyond his de-
sire to demythologize and revolt against monarchic prerogatives.
What, precisely, is the "law" that Paine declared to have dethroned
the king?
Does the phrase, penned by the advocate not only of our own
revolution, but also of the rights of man everywhere,2 presage our
modern practice of rights-based constitutionalism?3 By the "law"
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Louise
Weinberg for encouragement, comments, and criticisms of early drafts of this piece.
'Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Collected Writings 5, 34 (Eric Foner ed., 1995)
(emphasis omitted).
'See Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on the
French Revolution, 1791, in Collected Writings, supra note 1, at 433 [hereinafter
Paine, Rights of Man, Part One]; Thomas Paine, Rights of Man Part the Second:
Combining Principle and Practice, 1792, in Collected Writings, supra note 1, at 541
[hereinafter Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two].
3Professor Paul Kahn provocatively, if indirectly, suggests this in his masterful
philosophical exegesis of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), by using
Paine's famous remark as the title of the introductory chapter in his book on the case.
Paul W. Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of
America 1 (1997). As this Article will make clear, I think Professor Kahn's analysis of
the philosophical and historical meaning of Marbury is largely convincing, but I do
not think that Paine can be enlisted to promote the cause of constitutionalism as ex-
pounded by Marshall in that case, or by the Rehnquist, Warren, or Burger Courts of
today. In a slightly more expansive, but similar use, Professor Robert Ferguson uses
Paine's aphorism as the title of the first chapter in his extraordinary book on the
American idea of law at the time of the founding. Robert Ferguson, Law and Letters
in American Culture 11 (1984). Professor Ferguson then suggests in the text that
Paine's passionate embrace of the secular ideal of legalism echoed the highly idealis-
tic, richly humanistic, classically trained Jeffersonian conception of natural law em-
braced by many of the Framers. Id. at 16. Again, although Professor Ferguson's de-
scription of the classical and natural law conception of legalism at the time of the
1413
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that is to be king, might Paine have meant a body of constitutional
law that invoked Paine's beloved "rights of man" to constrain the
political power of the legislatures, just as in a well-functioning
monarchy the king, acting benignly with God's helping hand and in
the interest of his subjects, constrains the political power of those
merely mortal parliamentarians? This would give the declaration a
pleasing sort of prescience and an historical symmetry: We replace
the king with constitutional law and then bestow upon that law the
power, the virtue, and the near-irrebuttable moral authority tradi-
tionally associated with kings. Further, we accordingly reward it
not only with obedience, but reverence. The reverence, however, is
directed toward a worthy recipient-reasoned, principled, constitu-
tional law-rather than an unworthy one-whimsical boy-kings,
rhetorically blessed by the sun's rays but in fact moved by self-
aggrandizement, a lust for domination or empire, or worse. To
paraphrase Paine, in America, the law of the Constitution, consist-
ing of moral principles and emanating from the people themselves,
constrains the whimsy of momentarily empowered, self-interested
representatives. In America, constitutional law, rather than man, is
king.
This reading-in America, constitutional law is king-might also
make Paine an early friend of judicial review, as he was unques-
tionably a friend of United States constitutionalism, both federal
and state. In fact, by interpreting the "law" that is king in Paine's
declaration as, at core, a set of constitutional principles both limit-
ing politics and protecting the rights of man, Paine's manifesto can
be read as having foreseen the unfolding of our modern, court-
centered constitutional consciousness: A body of moral principles,
derived through reason, protects our rights and is enforced as law
by courts against the power of political authority. These moral
principles are sanctioned, unlike the monarchical claims to power
and virtue it displaced, by the Constitution's claim to speak for and
on behalf of the people. On this reading, the telling difference be-
tween American law and English monarchy is that in America, it is
law, meaning constitutional law, and not the king, that serves this
antipolitical, moral, and principled function. The commonality,
framing is a compelling one, it does not seem to fit either the writing or activism of
the populist and democratic Paine.
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however, is just as important. In America, no less than in England,
the excesses of politics are confined or checked in the name of
moral principle: in England, by the benign hand of the king; in
America, far more happily, by the settled wisdom of law and the
courts that are both constrained and empowered to uphold it.
Pleasing and even natural though such an interpretation may be,
however, my first contention in this Article will be simply that it is
an untenable reading of Tom Paine's philosophy. Neither Paine
nor his famous utterance can be drafted fairly to the cause of judi-
cial review or, more generally, to court-centered constitutionalism.
Rather, on the basis of Paine's collected writings, I think it is fair to
venture that Paine would have faulted our contemporary rights-
based, judge-produced constitutional law on the straightforward
grounds that it is thoroughly undemocratic. The evidence for this is
partly negative; nowhere (that I can find) does Paine explicitly ad-
vocate court-centered judicial review. Although Paine repeatedly
characterized the Constitution as "law,"' nowhere did he equate or
even characterize a constitution as a body of laws to be enforced by
courts. Further support-indirect but more compelling-comes
from Paine's attitude toward judicial power, which was unre-
lentingly hostile. As I will show below, when Paine spoke of courts,
the common law, the rule of precedent, common law judges, and
even of lawyers, he was as scathing and contemptuous as when he
spoke of the King.' Lastly, Paine's faith in unfettered representa-
tive democracy was likewise robust and uncompromising; he be-
lieved fervently that we, meaning each generation, should be ruled
by our own representatives, rather than by our ancestors. He de-
spised the idea of rule of the living by the dead as much as he de-
spised monarchy, and he argued in any number of contexts, in con-
trast to Edmund Burke,6 that the point of democracy and
democratic rule was precisely to counter, not preserve, the over-
'Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 468; Paine, Rights of Man, Part
Two, supra note 2, at 574.
'Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 582-84.
6 Paine subtitled his first rights of man essay "an Answer to Mr. Burke's Attack on
the French Revolution." Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 433. In his
Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke has offered a vigorous de-
fense of monarchic authority and privilege, as part of a traditionalist justification of
law and the state. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (J.C.D.
Clark ed., 2001).
2003] 1415
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bearing weight of tradition.7 His view of human nature underpin-
ning this robust faith in contemporaneous democracy was as
optimistic as his faith in democracy was absolute. He held what he
called the "republican" view that governors should legislate in the
spirit of and toward the end of the common good of all people,8
and he held the "democratic" view that representative democracy
is the best way to ensure that they will do so. Fully enfranchised
people themselves, rather than anyone purporting to act on their
behalf (whether or not disingenuously), Paine believed are best
able to discern that good.9 Throughout his tumultuous political life,
he clung to the hope that relatively unfettered commerce, lightly
regulated by lawmakers who were (1) representatives of people
armed with voting power and (2) acting in the public interest,
would enhance both equality and freedom and correct the gro-
tesque maldistributions of wealth that Paine thought were entirely
a function of generations of unchecked monarchic and oligarchic
privilege.'" The "law" that Paine hoped to see displace the king was
that declared by an elected, representative branch, acting in the in-
terest of and with the authority of the people. The law that should
replace the king in Paine's commonsensical utterance was not the
common law declared by judges, nor a natural law stemming from
an authority higher than that of any mortal sovereign, nor a body
of moral-constitutional principles designed or divined by courts
and enforced against the democratic, political branches. It was,
rather, the law as expressed by representatives doing the will of the
people, and acting in the interest of all. In short, despite his passion
for the developing legal-political culture in the newly formed
United States, Paine wrote primarily within a radical English po-
litical tradition of popular legislative supremacy and never really
veered from it.
Just as clearly, however, the story must be more complicated
than that. The unreconstructed republican-democrat Thomas Paine
was as renowned for his passionate defense of rights and un-
'See Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 438-39; Paine, Rights of Man,
Part Two, supra note 2, at 594-95.
Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 565-71.
'See id. at 567-68.
10 The best treatment of Paine's political philosophy and advocacy is Eric Foner,
Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (1976).
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abashed love of constitutionalism as for his advocacy of democracy
and denunciation of kings. Further, in both Rights of Man, Part
One and Rights of Man, Part Two, Paine refers to a constitution,
and particularly to the Pennsylvania Constitution for which he ac-
tively campaigned, as "law."" He clearly envisioned the role and
point of any constitution in a democratic society as a law that gov-
erns the governors, a law that dictates, in legalistic fashion, what
can and cannot be done, and what must and must not be done, by
the government for and on behalf of the people. Thus, in an early
passage in Rights of Man, Part One devoted to the topic of consti-
tutionalism, Paine defines a constitution:
A constitution ... is to a government, what the laws made after-
wards by that government are to a court of judicature. The court
of judicature does not make the laws, neither can it alter them; it
only acts in conformity to the laws made; and the government is
in like manner governed by the constitution.2
Paine advocated, in other words, what some today would call a
"legal," as opposed to a "political" or "populist" or "aspirational,"
constitution: 3 The Constitution truly is law, not politics. It governs,
controls, constrains, and restrains the governors. What did not fol-
low from this distinction for Paine was what seemingly follows for
most of us today-that because a constitution is "law" it must
therefore be enforced or interpreted by courts. Paine never speaks
of a "law of the constitution" or of a "constitutional law," enforced
by courts, constraining the power of the people's representatives,
and thus acting in accord with the Constitution but against the will
of the people. Nowhere does Paine couple his passion for constitu-
tionalism and the rights of man with a hint of support for the insti-
" Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 467-68; Paine, Rights of Man,
Part Two, supra note 2, at 574.Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 468.
3 Contrast the "thin," aspirational, and populist constitution described and advo-
cated by Mark Tushnet. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts 9-14, 50-52, 62-67, 106-13, 123-28, 166-68 (1999). See also Hendrik Hartog,
The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights that Belong to Us All," 74 J. Am.
Hist. 1013 (1987) (describing the history of constitutional rights used as political
rhetoric); Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 241 (1993)
(arguing for more expansive use of constitutional welfare rights outside the courts).
2003] 1417
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tution of judicial review, either in the limited Marbury v. Madison14
sense in which it was used toward the end of his life or in the more
robust "rights-oriented" form defended by proponents or attacked
by critics today.'5 Thus Paine embraced views that seem irreconcil-
able today. The most ardent advocate of democracy espoused legal
constitutionalism and a passion for rights, while maintaining a hos-
tility toward courts, a disdain for precedent, an absolute antago-
nism for the rule of the living by the dead, an equally absolute faith
in the good will and intelligence of democratically elected repre-
sentatives, and a pregnant silence on the question of judicial re-
view. That curiosity suggests the first set of questions I will con-
sider in this Article: If it was not our familiar Constitution with its
accompanying individual rights to be enforced by the apolitical
courts against the political branches, what was the Constitution to
Tom Paine? What was his conception of constitutional law? Of the
rights of man? Most importantly, what did Paine, a zealous advo-
cate of our revolution, think was the nature of law? How did
Paine's constitution and jurisprudence differ from the constitution
envisioned and the jurisprudence employed by Chief Justice John
Marshall? What ground, if any, did they share? The first Part of
this Article will attempt to answer those questions.
In the second Part of this Article, I will project this contrast into
the present. If something closer to Paine's constitution, rather than
Marshall's, had been the first step on our constitutional path, how
might that path have diverged from the one we in fact followed?
How might our constitutional practices be different today if Mar-
shall had regarded the constitution he was enforcing in Marbury,
and later expounding in McCulloch v. Maryland,6 more along the
lines envisioned by Paine? In Part II I will draw out the contrast
between Paine's constitution and modern constitutionalism.
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, Marshall recognized the validity of ju-
dicial review in the limited context of ministerial duties of members of the executive
branch and may have intended its use only in cases of clear contradictions between
positive law and constitutional text. Id. For a full argument that Marshall's under-
standing of judicial review was confined to these limited cases, see Sylvia Snowiss,
Text and Principle in John Marshall's Constitutional Law: The Cases of Marbury and
McCulloch, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 973, 981-88 (2000).
" The now classic defense of rights-based judicial review is Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously (1977).
117 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
1418 [Vol. 89:1413
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I will suggest in the third Part some of what we may have lost by
turning our backs on Paine's alternative constitutional vision. First,
we have lost our appreciation of the Constitution as the creator,
protector, and guarantor of representative democracy. Second, we
have lost our appreciation for the character and political virtue of
what might best be called the "constitutional legislator"-the legis-
lator who considers legislating in accordance with the law, constitu-
tional law in particular, to be his work. Finally, we have lost an un-
derstanding of, and certainly an appreciation for, our affirmative
legal constitution-that is to say, an understanding of what the
Constitution requires of lawmakers, instead of simply what it pro-
hibits. I will leave to the reader the question of whether the flame
of rights-based, court-produced constitutional law has been worth
the candle it has consumed.
I. PAINE AND CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL'S CONSTITUTIONS: ONE
CONTRAST
The ideal constitution that Paine envisioned, and thought
(wrongly) that he saw in early American constitutional practice
and constitution-making, might best be characterized as both legal
and popular. First, as he declared explicitly, the constitution should
be "to... government a law."' 7 What he meant by that phrase,
seemingly, was that the government empowered by the constitu-
tion should have no power to change it. 8 To that government, the
constitution was "law"-thus, Paine's constitutional legalism. Did
it follow, however, that because the constitution was "law" it
should be enforced, interpreted, or applied by courts? Seemingly
not, as nowhere does Paine endorse, or even mention, a judicial
role in enforcing the constitution. Rather, the constitution, as Paine
suggested in various passages of Rights of Man, was to be a law en-
forced by a process of continual, regular, democratic correction,
through popular discussion, legislative loyalty, and legislative in-
" Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574; see also id. (stating that the
constitution serves as a "law of controul [sic] to the government").
'8 See Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 469; Paine, Rights of Man,
Part Two, supra note 2, at 574-75, 578.
2003] 1419
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terpretation.' 9 We might call this Paine's constitutional populism.
This populism was as central to his conception of constitutional
value as was legalism: Paine believed constitutions had value be-
cause and to the degree that they enhanced popular participation
in political processes and strengthened the bond between the deci-
sions of the present governors and the interests of the presently
governed." Accordingly, it well may have been a given for Paine
that constitutions were to be enforced through democratic and po-
litical means.
Thus, after describing the Pennsylvania Constitution-the con-
stitution with which he is most closely identified and in support of
which he expended considerable political capital1 -Paine goes on
to praise it not only for its legalistic nature, but also for its democ-
ratic, popular character:
Here we see a regular process-a government issuing out of a
constitution, formed by the people in their original character;
and that constitution serving, not only as an authority, but as a
law of controul [sic] to the government. It was the political bible
of the state. Scarcely a family was without it. Every member of
the government had a copy; and nothing was more common,
when any debate arose on the principle of a bill, or on the extent
of any species of authority, than for the members to take the
printed constitution out of their pocket, and read the chapter
with which such matter in debate was connected.22
It is worth emphasizing that while the constitution Paine praised
was a law, it was a law held in private homes by families, regarded
as a "political bible," and possessed and relied upon by "[e]very
member of the government."23 Notable for its absence is any refer-
ence to judicial review, or any role for courts at all, in the enforce-
ment of constitutional limits on recalcitrant or overreaching politi-
cal actors. Rather, to revert to and to amplify Paine's definition of
" Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 469; Paine, Rights of Man, Part
Two, supra note 2, at 573-74, 576-78, 594-95.
20 See Paine, Rights of Man, Pa,'-, Two, supra note 2, at 594-95.
21 See generally Foner, supra note 10, at 141-44 (detailing Paine's advocacy of the
Pennsylvania Constitution).
22 Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574.
23Id.
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constitutionalism recited above, his constitution is directed at legis-
latures (rather than courts) in precisely the same way in which laws
are directed at courts. In modern terms, Paine seemingly envi-
sioned legislative rather than judicial attentiveness to the constitu-
tional restraints and requirements for proffered statutes. Just as
courts must review ordinary law to apply it in cases that come be-
fore them, so must legislatures interpret the constitution so as to
legislate in accordance with it.
Moreover, not only is the constitution to be enforced through a
process of legislative fealty, but it should be kept current through a
process of continual, popular reformulation, revision, redrafting,
and amending. In Paine's longest sustained discussion of constitu-
tions, he praised effusively both the American states' constitutions
and the French Constitution precisely because, in his view, they
could be continually revised and redrafted by the people of the
generation to be affected:
One of the greatest improvements that has been made for the
perpetual security and progress of constitutional liberty, is the
provision which the new constitutions make for occasionally re-
vising, altering, and amending them.
The constitutions of America, and also that of France, have ei-
ther affixed a period for their revision, or laid down the mode by
which improvements shall be made. It is perhaps impossible to
establish any thing that combines principles with opinions and
practice, which the progress of circumstances, through a length of
years, will not in some measure derange, or render inconsis-
tent .... The Rights of Man are the rights of all generations of
men, and cannot be monopolized by any. That which is worth
following will be followed for the sake of its worth; and it is in
this that its security lies, and not in any conditions with which it
may be encumbered. When a man leaves property to his heirs, he
does not connect it with an obligation that they shall accept it. Why
then should we do otherwise with respect to constitutions?24
24 Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added).
20031 1421
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In similar language, Paine praised the Pennsylvania Constitution
precisely because it provided for its own redrafting every seven
years:
This [Pennsylvania] convention, of which Benjamin Franklin
was president, having met and deliberated, and agreed upon a
constitution, they next ordered it to be published, not as a thing
established, but for the consideration of the whole people, their
approbation or rejection, and then adjourned to a stated time.
When the time of adjournment was expired, the convention re-
assembled; and as the general opinion of the people in approba-
tion of it was then known, the constitution was signed, sealed,
and proclaimed on the authority of the people and the original in-
strument deposited as a public record....
No article of this constitution could be altered or infringed at
the discretion of the government that was to ensue. It was to that
government a law. But as it would have been unwise to preclude
the benefit of experience, and in order also to prevent the accu-
mulation of errors, if any should be found, and to preserve an
unison of government with the circumstances of the state at all
times, the constitution provided, that, at the expiration of every
seven years, a convention should be elected, for the express pur-
pose of revising the constitution, and making alterations, addi-
tions, or abolitions therein, if any such should be found neces-
sary."
It seems that by the time of his most considered writing on the
topic, Paine's praise of constitutionalism had become entirely con-
ditional upon his understanding that constitutions would give di-
rect voice to the generation of people living under them-thereby
enhancing, not constraining, contemporaneous, representative
politics.26 He certainly did not evince a preference for the reasoned,
adjudicated elaboration of a common law constraining the work of
the representative branches. Indeed, to the degree that courts
25 Id. at 573-74.
2 See id. at 594-95.
1422 [Vol. 89:1413
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thwarted the work of legislation, which Paine believed they did
through their reliance on precedent, he stood as a critic of judicial
involvement.27 More fundamentally, Paine praised the state consti-
tutions, and eventually the federal constitutions of America and
France as well, because in his view they placed the power to form
government in the hands of the people, thereby severing connec-
tions to tyrants, monarchs, conquerors, and others who rule by
force.28 He praised constitutionalism when and because it en-
hanced, rather than constrained, representative democracy.
How does Paine's understanding of constitutionalism as spelled
out in Rights of Man square with that of John Marshall as set out in
the roughly contemporaneous Marbury v. Madison? There is less
direct conflict than one might at first surmise, given our modern
understanding of that case's meaning and importance. Both men
speak of the Constitution as law, as do we. Interestingly, however,
both are careful to contrast the law that is "constitutional law" with
the "ordinary law" that is applied by courts. Neither in Rights of
Man, nor in Marbury is the word "law" ever used to designate, in-
discriminately, either "ordinary law" or "constitutional law." In
fact, both Marshall and Paine seem to have understood by the un-
adorned word "law" something that must be modified to ensure
sufficient precision. On the one hand, "law" can refer to the ordi-
nary law produced by legislators and which, according to Paine,
neither can be made nor altered by courts29-the "legislative act,"
to use Marshall's phrase.30 On the other hand, the word "law" can
refer to the paramount, fundamental, or supreme law of the Con-
stitution.31
For Paine, the functional meaning of this distinction was clear:
Ordinary law was produced by legislators and then "directed to"
and applied by courts, whereas constitutional law was produced by
the people and then directed to government.32 The point is often
27 Id. at 583-84.
28 Id. at 573-76, 594-95.
29 Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 468.
30 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
31 Id.; Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 468 (stating that the constitu-
tion is an act of the people rather than an act of government that the government
cannot control or alter); Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574.
12 Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 468.
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lost in discussions of Marbury, but Marshall maintains the same
semantic distinction. When Marshall speaks of the Constitution as
"law," he qualifies that language: He speaks of constitutional law
as a "paramount law,"33 as a "fundamental" law," and quoting Ar-
ticle VI of the Constitution itself, as the "supreme law."35 Other-
wise, he is careful to contrast the Constitution, on the one hand,
with ordinary law, on the other.
This distinction between ordinary law and paramount law, and
the meaning and significance of that distinction, is important, but it
is often lost in our post-realist conversations about John Marshall,
Marbury, and judicial review. Nowhere in his opinion does Mar-
shall refer to the Constitution as simple, ordinary law, which the
courts must interpret and enforce consistent with their role of in-
terpreting the law. Nowhere does he make the quasi-legal realist
argument that the courts must have the power of judicial review
because, syllogistically, it is the courts' role to interpret the law, the
Constitution is law, and therefore the courts must interpret the
Constitution. Rather, when Marshall states that "it is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is[,]"36 it is clear from the context37 (and also, as a number of
historians have now shown, from the historical record38) that the
referent of "law" in that sentence is ordinary law. It is the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the ordinary law is,
and part of that duty, according to Marshall, is the responsibility of
looking to the Constitution to see whether the ordinary law con-
flicts with it and therefore is void.
" Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
Id.
35 Id. at 180.
36Id. at 177.
17 The paragraph in which this statement appears discusses the task courts face when
they must deal with two conflicting directives of non-constitutional law. The next
paragraph then discusses the task courts must face when dealing with a conflict be-
tween non-constitutional law and the Constitution. Marshall found these situations
analogous, but not identical. See id. at 177-78.
38 See, e.g., Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison, Judicial Review, and Con-
stitutional Supremacy in the Nineteenth Century, in Marbury Versus Madison,
Documents and Commentary 73 (Mark A. Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002);
Snowiss, supra note 14, at 981, 986-88; Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Power and Popular
Sovereignty, in Marbury Versus Madison, Documents and Commentary, supra at 181.
[Vol. 89:14131424
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No less than Paine, then, Marshall maintains throughout Mar-
bury the distinction between ordinary law and the Constitution. In
fact, Marshall consistently contrasts, rather than conflates, the two
categories to build the case for judicial review. Nowhere is this as
clear as in the three paragraphs that most cleanly establish the hi-
erarchical relationship between the law and the Constitution, and
the courts' duties regarding both:
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law
and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court
must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding
the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the con-
stitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is
to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the
constitution, and see only the law.3"
In other words, Marshall does make the case for judicial review,
but nowhere does he make the syllogistic argument for judicial in-
terpretive supremacy that has been attributed to him, at least since
the time of Cooper v. Aaron.4 The mistake lies in the ambiguity la-
tent in the second premise, that it is the courts' duty to say what the
law is. Marshall clearly states that it is the courts' duty to say what
the law is and that the Constitution is supreme law. But "law" is
not "supreme law," so it does not necessarily follow that it is the
courts' duty to say what the supreme law is. Rather, what Marshall
says in Marbury-and all that he says-is that it is the courts' duty,
" Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178 (emphasis added).
4' 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal ju-
diciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and in-
dispensable feature of our constitutional system.").
HeinOnline -- 89 Va. L. Rev.  1425 2003
1426 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:1413
when saying what the ordinary law is, to look to the Constitution to
determine whether or not the ordinary law is void. Marshall never
says that it is emphatically the duty of the courts to say what the
constitutional law is.
Further, nowhere in Marbury does Marshall deny the various in-
ferences regarding legislative responsibility for the constitutionality
of proposed law that Paine had drawn from the distinction between
ordinary law and constitutional law. Marshall does not deny that
the legislator should carry the Constitution in his pocket, so to
speak, that the Constitution should be a part of legislative debate,
or that the Constitution should occupy a place next to the family
Bible on the fireplace mantel of American citizens." Nowhere does
Marshall suggest-at least in his Marbury opinion-that either
Congress or the people have no role or only a limited role to play
in the interpretation of the Constitution, nor that it would be im-
proper for a legislator to invoke the Constitution when urging a
bill, nor that doing so would be some sort of usurpation of judicial
authority. Marshall does not even suggest that judicial interpreta-
tion should hold an authoritative position over interpretations ren-
dered by coequal branches. To assert that it is the province of the
judiciary to decide what the (ordinary) law is in no way undercuts
the assumption that it is the province of the legislator to decide
what the ordinary law shall be, and that, in accordance with each
institution's responsibilities, it is the duty of both to consult the
Constitution when doing their respective institutional tasks. In-
deed, the defensive style of the discussion in Marbury suggests
something very much to the contrary. Marshall's argument that
courts must look at the Constitution to know whether the ordinary
law is law can most naturally be read as resting on the unstated as-
sumption that Congress would naturally interpret and apply the
supreme law of the Constitution when deciding what the ordinary
law shall be. The only question addressed by the Chief Justice,
then, is whether courts should also do so when deciding what the
ordinary law is. In other words, the issue in Marbury may be char-
acterized as whether courts, because of their role as expositors of
the law, must also shoulder the obligation to consult constitutional
authority when deciding what the ordinary law is (that being their
See Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574 (advocating all of these).
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province and duty), no less than legislators must consult constitu-
tional authority when deciding what the ordinary law shall be.
42
Let me sum it up this way: Marshall, at least in Marbury, explic-
itly endorses judicial review, but he is silent on the legitimacy of
legislative review and the relation between the two, and it is likely
that he did not see them in conflict. It is at least a possible reading
of Marbury that Marshall decided that the courts must consult the
Constitution when deciding what the ordinary law is-that being
the special province of the judiciary-just as the legislator must
consult the Constitution when deciding what the ordinary law shall
be-that, after all, being the province of the legislator.43 In Rights
of Man, Paine is silent on judicial review, but quite explicitly en-
dorses legislative review-if by "review" one means simply legisla-
tive consultation and interpretation of constitutional norms."
There is thus no reason to think he would have disapproved of the
relatively narrow outcome in Marbury, although as I will show be-
low, he could have done without the rhetorical dicta. The overlap is
this: Neither Marshall nor Paine denies the legitimacy, necessity,
coherence, or desirability of active, ongoing, legislative interpreta-
tion and application of constitutional norms. Neither denies the le-
gitimacy of judicial interpretation, either. Marshall argues the ne-
cessity of the latter, while Paine goes at least some distance toward
explicitly endorsing the desirability of the former. Neither, how-
ever, writes as though one precludes the other.
Nonetheless, a fundamental difference between the two concep-
tions of constitutional law and ordinary law does emerge from
these roughly contemporaneous documents. Where Marshall's un-
derstanding of constitutionalism does depart, and radically, from
Paine's, is in his insistence on the permanence, or at least the sta-
bility, of constitutional norms. Paine envisioned a constitution as a
law governing the legislature, and therefore unchangeable by that
42 Marshall concludes with the telling observation that "the framers of the constitu-
tion contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of
the legislature." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80.
41 Cf. Waldron, supra note 38, at 191 (reading Marshall as advocating only this co-
equal power of judicial review: "Marshall is in fact arguing that their duties in respect
to the Constitution are no less than the legislators', not that they are inherently supe-
rior") (emphasis omitted).
44 Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574.
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legislature,45 but one that would be subject to constant popular,
democratic revision. Future generations are no more bound to ac-
cept constitutional law, Paine argued, than an heir is bound to ac-
cept an inheritance.4" It is a law that by its nature must be owned,
endorsed, and valued by each generation affected by it in an active,
participatory, and thoroughly political process." Paine envisioned
the constitution as a law, in short, that would flow from politics,
even as it constrained politics.
Marshall, in contrast, endorsed a permrnent, stable constitution,
which, once made, could not and should not be altered. The con-
trast could not be more total. Listen to Marshall on the topic:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their fu-
ture government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole
American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original
right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be fre-
quently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are
deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be
permanent. 
4
Here is the heart of the conflict between the Painean and Mar-
shallian constitutions-not so much the question of institutional re-
sponsibility, but rather the more political question of constitutional
stability. For Marshall, that the people "have an original right to
establish, for their future government,' 49 constitutional principles
governing their happiness, is the very cloth from which the fabric
of American society is sewn. For Paine, it is not too strong to say
that such a right, should it exist, would destroy the American fab-
ric.5" As demonstrated above, Paine fervently believed no genera-
tion has an obligation to accept the constitutional principles laid
down by another, any more than an heir has an obligation to accept
45 Id.41 Id. at 594-95.
"7 Id. at 578.
41 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176 (emphasis added).
49 Id.
'0 See Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 594-95.
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an inheritance laid down by an ancestor." For Marshall, the project
of constitution-making is such a "great exertion" that it ought
never be repeated;5 2 for Paine, however intense the exertion, it
ought to be repeated indeed-occasionally, regularly, or, if need
be, frequently. 3 For Marshall, these fundamental principles are to
be permanent. For Paine, these principles are fundamental, but by
no means permanent. For Marshall, the constitutional restraint im-
posed on Congress comes from a source entirely apart from the
Congress thus constrained: an earlier, generative, and one-time
constitutional moment when the limits on the powers of the law-
maker were forever fixed. For Paine, the constitutional restraint
imposed on Congress or state legislatures comes from the people
of the same generation as the representatives themselves.
This distinction between the two men's understandings of the
nature of constitutions-and, hence, of the nature of the funda-
mental law governing the governors-is profound. It is not simply
the distinction between judicial review and legislative review of
legislation. Paine's constitutional law, like Marshall's, was meant to
constrain the government. The rabble-rousing democrat Paine54
wanted legislation to come from an orderly constitutional process
constrained by law, of which the Constitution was to be the source.
Paine endorsed every expansion of the franchise suggested in his
day and even added a few of his own reckoning.5
Nonetheless, it does not follow that Paine idealized unrestrained
rule by the mob. The constitution was to be a law for the gover-
nors; it was to bind their actions. His affection for constitutional-
ism, however, by no means stemmed from a distrust of politics,
participatory democracy, the people (even a majority of them) or
"I Id. at 574.
52 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
"Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574-75, 594-95.
See generally Foner, supra note 10, at 107-44 (describing Paine's philosophical
radicalism and egalitarianism, and his political activism in Philadelphia during the
early 1770s).
" See Foner, supra note 10, at 142-44 (noting that Paine advocated the abolition of
property ownership as a requirement for voting and advocating that the right to vote
be "as universal as taxation").
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their representatives. 6 He viewed constitutional law as itself a
product of the political process, but in a longer and deeper wave-
a constitutionally creative moment followed in relatively quick or-
der by legislation, which would in turn be constrained and directed
by constitutional mandate. In this regard, Paine's constitution-
one constituted anew through representative politics on a regular
basis and which no particular generation is ever obligated to ac-
cept-is a far cry from the constitution (somewhat) expounded by
Marshall in Marbury. Marshall advocated an unchanging constitu-
tion that constrains political outcomes by limiting the options of
each generation by the presumed intergenerational consensus di-
vined some time in the past. Like the particular American constitu-
tions he thought came close to embodying it, Paine's constitutional
ideal-lawful but populist, fundamental yet tentative-was in this
regard the antithesis of the stable, intergenerational document de-
scribed by Marshall.
It is important, however, to stress that Paine's constitution is not
simply the rejected alternative in Marshall's formalistic dualism: an
"ordinary legislative act[], and like other acts,. . . alterable when
the legislature shall please to alter it."5 That construction leaves
out the conceptual space that Paine's three-pronged conception of
populist constitutional law occupies: a body of law that does indeed
constrain politics but that also emanates from politics and is ulti-
mately enforced through politics. All three points are central to
Paine's constitutionalism. First, Paine's constitution, no less than
Marshall's, is a fundamental law governing the acts of governors, a
constraint on, not an extension of, that government. It is no "ordi-
nary legislative act."58 This does not mean, however, that it is not a
political or even legislative act; it is. What it is not is an ordinary
legislative act. It is both legislative and extraordinary: produced by
the people and their representatives in constitutional but entirely
political legislative moments. 9 Second, precisely because it is a leg-
islative act, albeit not an ordinary one, the constitution has to ema-
56 On the contrary, Paine admired constitutions as much as he did precisely because
they emanate directly from the people's will. Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra
note 2, at 572-75.
"7 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
58 Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 467-68.
59Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574, 594-95.
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nate repeatedly from the people, from every generation that ac-
cepts it.60 Its original purpose, and its continuing function, is to
tighten rather than loosen the bonds that tie lawmakers to the peo-
ple on whose behalf they legislate. Its genesis was an attempt to es-
tablish the democratic power of the people, not to limit, check, dis-
aggregate, separa t e, or counter it, and its continuing function ought
to be the same. Third, it is to be enforced through legislative inter-
pretation and action in accordance with its mandates.6 ' Legislators
should regard the constitution as binding, referencing and employ-
ing it in legislative argument when deciding what the law shall be-
just as, for Marshall, the courts must turn to it to decide what the
law is. I will return to and expand upon this third point, which is
the most consequential for modern purposes, below.
Let me conclude this Part by returning, briefly, to Paine's fa-
mous utterance. What did he mean by declaring that in America,
law is king? I have argued that Paine did not mean that in America,
law-or constitutional law, or the rule of law-limits politics, as the
king might in a well-functioning monarchy. Instead, Paine meant
that self-rule governs in America, in both the republican and de-
mocratic senses: The law to be accorded the respect given to mon-
archs in other locales is that produced by representative legisla-
tures acting in the interest of all the people. The law that is king is
not a law, constitutional or otherwise, that limits politics. Rather, it
is the law produced through political processes in the interest and
at the behest of the people affected by it.
Does this unqualified advocacy of pure, representative, majori-
tarian democracy give rise to contradiction, coming as it does from
an ardent defender of rights, constitutions, and constitutional law?
I think it does not, but seeing why requires us to put aside modern
conceptions of both law and constitutions. "Law" did not necessar-
ily mean in Paine's time "that which is applied by courts. 62 Rather,
law could be either extraordinary or ordinary, fundamental or leg-
islative, directed to government or directed to courts. And while
the province of the judiciary was to interpret and apply the latter,
6' Id. at 594.
61 Id. at 574.
62 Of course, this is precisely the account Paine gave of ordinary law. Paine, Rights
of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 468.
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the same was not true of the former. Therefore, constitutional law,
for Paine, unlike ordinary law, could be "law" without being the
sort of thing that requires judicial interpretation, application, or
oversight. It could be law and nevertheless be directed at and in-
terpreted and applied by legislatures-sometimes constraining and
at other times mandating or guiding their course of action.
But in what sense, then, is constitutional law still "law"? What
does it share with ordinary law, if not the quality of being "that
which is applied by courts"? What makes constitutional law a spe-
cies of law, in Paine's view, was precisely that quality that makes
law, unlike monarchs, worthy of respect: Like ordinary law, consti-
tutional law emanates from politics (albeit in extraordinary rather
than ordinary moments), reflects the will of the people it governs,
and is directed at the preservation of their interests and the fur-
therance of their well-being. What constitutional law shares with
ordinary law, in other words, is that both are the products of poli-
tics. Both are the results of representative democratic acts.
Here, the contrast of Paine's views, not only with Marshall's, but
also with modern constitutional sensibilities, is near total. For the
modernist, constitutional law shares with ordinary law the realist
quality of being the subject of judicial application; constitutional
law, like ordinary law, is that which courts apply, discover, and in-
terpret. The widespread acceptance of this realist definition of law
is, I think, the reason for the constant misreading of Marshall's pe-
nultimate argument for judicial review, that it is the province of the
courts to say what the law is. To the modern reader, including the
mid-century Court in Cooper v. Aaron,63 the word "law" in that
sentence refers to the law of the Constitution, and because the
Constitution is law, it must therefore be the Court's role to say
what it is. ' Again, what constitutional law shares with ordinary law,
63 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
64 Professor John Harrison's otherwise strong article reconstructing Marshall's ar-
gument for judicial review suffers from this flaw, in my view. In Professor Harrison's
reconstruction, the text precludes congressional review because it is Congress's role to
make, not interpret, the "law," and the courts' claim to finality likewise follows from
the Constitution's status as law. John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Impli-
cations of Judicial Review, 84 Va. L. Rev. 333, 367-68 (1998). For an argument that
Marshall in fact held views closer to the Jeffersonian conception, including a rejection
of judicial finality, an openness to the possibility of concurrent constitutional review
and debate, and a limitation of final judicial review to specific cases rather than ques-
1432 [Vol. 89:1413
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for the modern constitutionalist, is the quality of being that which
courts apply when doing the work of saying what the law is. For
Paine, however, the essence of law was more complex; the quality
of being that which courts apply was the defining attribute merely
of ordinary law, not of law per se.65 Constitutional law, in contrast,
was directed to government.66 The essence of law common to both,
then, was not that both are applied and hence interpreted by
courts.
Rather, what constitutional law and ordinary law share is their
genesis in representative, democratic politics. And precisely be-
cause the content of constitutional law was to be a product of poli-
tics as well as a limit upon it, reflective of the will of the living, not
the dead, requiring democracy, not compromising or checking it, it
deserves our respect and rightly commands our obedience. Due to
the traits constitutional law shares with ordinary law-its republi-
can ambition and its democratic origin-it is worth the revolution
it took to win it. Because constitutional law, like all law, partakes
of, is produced by, and is a part of politics, it is king in America.
II. THE PAINEIAN CONSTITUTION AND MODERN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: ONE CONTRAST
Paine's populist-legal constitution has clearly been lost to us
through time. In the case law that now constitutes our story of con-
stitutionalism, we have embraced, first, the necessity of judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of legislative action put forward by
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.7 Second, we have adopted the
practice of judicial supremacy of constitutional interpretation
should the courts' reading of the Constitution conflict with that of
other political actors, a practice forcefully asserted by the Warren
Court more than a hundred years after Marbury in Cooper v.
Aaron.6" Finally, we have accepted the habit of judicial exclusivity,
culminating in the modern argument found in Rehnquist Court de-
tions, see David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial Re-
view, 42 Duke L.J. 279 (1992).65 Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 467-68.
6Id.
67 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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cisions and elsewhere, that not only is judicial review necessary and
necessarily authoritative in the event of conflict, but that judicial
interpretation should be exclusive. This argument holds that no
other branch, particularly Congress, has the power to venture and
act upon its own interpretation of the Constitution. 9 Rather, it is
apparently the Court's understanding that only the courts, as ex-
positors of the law, can tell us the meaning of the Constitution."
69 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), where Justice Ken-
nedy writes:
When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the prov-
ince of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177. When the political branches of the Gov-
ernment act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies
the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled prin-
ciples, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
[The Religious Freedom Restoration Act] was designed to control cases and
controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal
statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this Court's
precedent, not RFRA, which must control.
Since City of Boerne, the Court has tightened its control over constitutional interpre-
tive authority considerably, limiting Congress's § 5 powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, to legislation consistent with both the Court's understand-
ing of the meaning of that amendment and the Court's method of determining when
states are in violation. That method of reasoning, interestingly, has its origins in an
acknowledgement that the judiciary is comparatively ill-suited to factfinding. See
Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 145-52 (2001) (dis-
cussing modern cases limiting Congress's § 5 and Commerce Clause powers, particu-
larly Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001),
and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)). For an argument to the
effect that only Congress lacks final interpretive authority of constitutional questions
because it is Congress's power to make, not interpret, law, see Harrison, supra note
64, at 367-68.
7 The two most important cases asserting the seeds of this exclusive authority,
which at least one commentator calls the doctrine of "judicial sovereignty," see, e.g.,
Kramer, supra note 69, at 14, will likely turn out to be United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995), in which the Court invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which had
made it a federal offense to possess a firearm near a school, as violative of the "judi-
cially enforceable outer limits" of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause, id. at 566, and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), in which the
Court struck down portions of the Violence Against Women Act because the evi-
dence Congress had amassed showing an impact on interstate commerce was not suf-
ficient. In Morrison, the Court held that "'[s]imply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so.... [W]hether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this
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Through this evolution of ideas, the constitution Paine thought he
saw in the American example-a constitution for and to the gov-
ernment-has become a constitution for and to courts. Through
this evolution, the popular-legalist constitution that was so clearly
the object of Paine's praise and admiration has utterly disappeared.
The contemporary practice of judicial review, by which courts de-
ploy precedent, original meaning, fundamental values, or neutral
principles so as to constrain state action and expand individual or
corporate freedom, whatever its merits or demerits, is not even an
echo of the revolutionary and democratic implications of Tom
Paine's commonsensical utterances.
The loss of Tom Paine's Constitution is regrettable; it has cost us
constitutional principles and practices that may have proven wor-
thy. I will try to explain what those may be in the next Part of this
Article. Before doing so, however, it is worth noting that the pri-
mary cost of the disappearance of Paine's envisioned constitution is
simply logical: It has impaled us on the horns of an unappealing
and false dilemma. That dilemma was famously described, and
perhaps created, by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, and our con-
stitutional practices have been misguided by it ever since. Here is
Marshall's account of our constitutional options:
The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchange-
able by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legisla-
tive acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature
shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative
act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be
true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part
of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable.
Court."' Id. at 614 (citations omitted). Here, Congress had failed to make such a
showing because Congress had "rel[ied] so heavily on a method of reasoning that we
have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution's enu-
meration of powers." Id. at 615. For forceful critiques of the Court's preemptory con-
stitutionalism in these cases and others, see Kramer, supra note 69; Victoria Nourse,
Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy (Mar. 26, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions con-
template them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation, and consequently the theory of every such govern-
ment must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution,
and is consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the
fundamental principles of our society.7
These alternatives seem, in retrospect, both undesirable and un-
tenable. The option Marshall rejects-that legislative acts contrary
to the Constitution and therefore not law might nevertheless oblige
the courts to give them effect-has never been tried in the United
States. The effect of Marshall's decision has been to eliminate this
possible understanding of what it might mean to have a written
constitution. It is hard to declare an untested program a failure.
Furthermore, it may well be, as a number of contemporary consti-
tutional scholars who doubt the wisdom of judicial review now
regularly argue,72 that Marshall dismissed this possibility too
quickly. Constitutions enforced, interpreted, and changed by ordi-
nary legislative means may not be as utterly meaningless as Mar-
shall supposes. Courts would have to enforce all laws passed by
legislatures, but that would not necessarily render the Constitution
meaningless; the possible unconstitutionality of a statute would
remain as a matter for the political process to resolve. If a legislator
persisted in voting for unconstitutional legislation, his constituents
could simply vote him out of office, no less than if he persisted in
voting for legislation widely viewed as unwise.
Nevertheless, Marshall's rejection of the possibility that courts
should enforce unconstitutional laws accords with common sense
and common experience and has met the test of time. For any
friend of constitutionalism, constitutional law without any sort of
judicial review whatsoever is hard to imagine, and it is so for the
71 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
72 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, sup:a note 13, at 56 (arguing that "[tihe Supreme Court
at its best is clearly a lot better than Congress at its worst[, b]ut Congress at its best is
better than the Court at its worst" and citing examples of congressional constitutional
interpretation that have proven more lasting and more ambitious than judicial consti-
tutional interpretation); see also authorities cited supra note 13.
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reason Marshall ultimately gave: It would impose on courts the un-
acceptable responsibility of simply ignoring the possible or perhaps
irrefutable unconstitutionality of the law they are being asked to
apply. The problem with constitutionalism sans judicial review may
not be, as some of Marshall's more contentious arguments seem to
suggest, that the Constitution would have no force in such a world;
it could clearly still have force as a document of great political sig-
nificance. The real problem with a constitutional world in which
judges play no part is in the construction of the judicial role: It is
hard to see how their work is to proceed if they cannot consider
constitutional questions. Some sort of judicial review may or may
not be essential to an understanding of the Constitution as a law of
restraint, rather than a mere statement of political aspiration, but it
is clearly essential to an understanding of courts as expositors of
law. The first horn of Marshall's dilemma is as untenable as he sug-
gested it to be.
But what of the second horn of the dilemma, Marshall's pre-
ferred alternative? Is it either tenable or desirable? Let us start
with whether or not it is tenable. It seems clear that Marshall's
formulation of a "constitution ... [as] a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means,"" has proven unsound in prac-
tice, regardless of whether we continue to pay it lip service in the-
ory. We do not have a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means. Rather, we have a body of constitutional law con-
straining the freedom of political actors that is completely change-
able by ordinary judicial means; namely, our traditional, common
law methods of reasoned, judicial elaboration of legally binding
precedent. What is odd about our constitutional law when viewed
as a body of common law is not that it is unchangeable. Indeed, it is
no less changeable than the law of contracts or torts, and it may in
fact be more changeable. There might be much to commend this
common law body of constitutional law. Through such a practice,
courts bind the populace to principles they deem fundamental,
principles which might, after all, be very good. The principles on
which Brown v. Board of Education4 and Roe v. Wade75 were de-
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7'410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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cided seem like very good principles, and the bad principles on
which the bad cases-Dred Scott v. Sandford,76 Plessy v. Ferguson,"
Lochner v. New YorkV-were decided are luckily principles cur-
rent judges disavow. We may have lucked out: The principles un-
dergirding this nondemocratic and antipolitical body of law and
dictating the terms of our democracy and our politics are, right
now at least, basically good and decent. Further, the practice of
constitutional common law might go some way toward ensuring
that formal equality is accorded to litigants. Rules of precedent,
stare decisis, and the like, which govern judge-made law, are neces-
sary to ensure that like cases are treated alike in a way that both
maintains the integrity of law and accords with common under-
standings of justice. Lastly, the practice of fidelity to precedent and
an evolutionary rather than convulsive approach to constitutional
adjudication helps to ensure that the Court continues to garner the
respect necessary to assure some degree of voluntary compliance
with its decisions by citizens and officials.
Thus, our method of constitutional common law seems to have
given us some benefits: some good principles of governance, some
measure of formal equality for litigants, and a Court that has
earned the respect it needs for its judgments to be enforced. The
one thing our entrenched practice of common law constitutional-
ism clearly does not do, however, is protect or enforce what Mar-
shall thought he saw in the Constitution: an act of an "original and
supreme will" expressed in one great exertion, rarely to be re-
peated, laying down fundamental principles designed to be perma-
nent.79 The evolving constitution presumed by our entrenched prac-
tice of common law constitutionalism is as far removed from the
one produced by Marshall's metaphoric original and supreme will,
both binding and determining the future, as it is from Paine's
metaphoric testamentary bequest, obliging no particular recipient
and accepted by its beneficiaries only to whatever degree they
might find acceptable.'
76 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
77 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
79Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77.
8 No case makes this clearer than Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992). Justice O'Connor's famous dictum in that decision ("Liberty finds no refuge in
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Would Marshall's constitutional "Big Bang" be desirable, how-
ever, even if it were a tenable account of our constitutional prac-
tices? Very little said in Marbury itself commends it. In Marbury,
the principle of government underlying Marshall's preference for a
"permanent" body of constitutional law, "unchangeable by ordi-
nary means,"'" is that "the people have an original right to estab-
lish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opin-
ion, shall most conduce to their own happiness."' Further, "[t]he
principles, therefore, so established" are consequently "designed to
be permanent."" The people, then, have an "original right" to es-
tablish permanent principles that in their view will most conduce to
happiness. But this argument is pretty flimsy. If Marshall's point
had been that the people have a right to establish, for their own fu-
ture government, principles for their own happiness, the argument
would have been unassailable, so long as it makes sense to think
that our considered, long-term constitutional judgments might be
an improvement over our short-term political decisions (just as
some suggest that our short-term political decisions might be an
improvement over our short-term consumption choices'). But the
idea that the people of one era have an "original right" to decide
principles that they believe will most conduce to the happiness of
a jurisprudence of doubt."), id. at 844, and her holding rested squarely upon the
Court's need to maintain consistency with the precedential constitutional past, not
with the "original and supreme will." Id. at 854-55. She framed the issue in Casey as
whether the Court should breach expectations secured by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), not as whether the Court should breach the "original and supreme will." Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. at 854-61. O'Connor held that the Court should not violate the rights
secured by Roe for the same reasons that courts adhere to stare decisis generally: the
need for consistency in adjudication and the dependence of decisional liberty on pre-
dictable judicial pronouncements. The result is not allegiance to an unchanging con-
stitutional generative moment, but allegiance to recent case law, which cannot be
changed through legislative means.
The Washington Post reported that the controversial Miguel Estrada, when testify-
ing in front of Congress for confirmation to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, repeatedly asserted his willingness to "follow prece-
dent" and to apply Roe v. Wade because Roe "'is the law."' Benjamin Wittes, Silence
Is Honorable, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23. The law, in other words, is Supreme
Court precedent, not the Constitution itself.
81 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
2Id. at 176.
8 Id.
84 See, e.g., Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and
Contradiction in Environmental Law, 12 Envtl. L. 283,284-86 (1982).
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future generations, and that that right is the foundation on which
"the whole American fabric has been erected," is quite dubious.
85
How could there possibly be, in a democracy, an "original right" in
one generation to decide fundamental principles of governance for
future citizens? What would be the source of this original right? Or
does the adjective "original" mean that it has no origin but is the
source of all other rights? But if it has no origin, what is the argu-
ment for its existence? And if it has no origin, and if it is truly a
right to lay down principles governing the happiness of future gen-
erations that have no political control over them, how is that right
any different from the "original right" of monarchs to do likewise?
Tom Paine, whatever his unstated views on judicial review, was
an unequivocal critic of what might be called Marshall's "perma-
nent constitutionalism." Throughout his involvement with the
ideas and practices of constitutionalism, Paine consistently criti-
cized the view, as central to Marshall's conception as judicial re-
view itself, that constitutions must be unchanging and their princi-
ples permanent. In part, and as discussed above, Paine's objection
was simply that a too firmly entrenched constitution would never
benefit from the wisdom of accumulated experiences. 6 But he also
had a more specific objection. The particular constitutions of the
late eighteenth century, in his view, represented great advances in
human understanding, but they also came at an historical moment
that retained the "barbarism" of earlier, pre-democratic, and pre-
constitutional understandings of political life.' To freeze constitu-
tionalism, he feared, would freeze these barbaric understandings.
85 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
'6 Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 574, 594-95. Paine also viewed
permanent constitutionalism as of a piece with Burkean political theory and objec-
tionable for that reason alone. In Rights of Man, Part Two he explicitly joined the
two:
One of the greatest improvements that has been made for the perpetual secu-
rity and progress of constitutional liberty, is the provision which the new consti-
tutions make for occasionally revising, altering, and amending them.
The principle upon which Mr. Burke formed his political creed, that "of bind-
ing and controuling [sic] posterity to the end of time, and of renouncing and ab-
dicating the rights of all posterity for ever," is now become too detestable to be
made a subject of debate; and, therefore, I pass it over with no other notice than
exposing it.
Id. at 594.
87 Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 595.
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This passage from Rights of Man, Part Two, pointing toward a fu-
ture when constitutionalism itself might embrace a cosmopolitan
and universalist, rather than a nationalist and particularist, under-
standing of rights is typical:
The best constitution that could now be devised, consistent
with the condition of the present moment, may be far short of
that excellence which a few years may afford. There is a morning
of reason rising upon man on the subject of government, that has
not appeared before. As the barbarism of the present old gov-
ernments expires, the moral condition of nations with respect to
each other will be changed. Man will not be brought up with the
savage idea of considering his species as his enemy, because the
accident of birth gave the individuals existence in countries dis-
tinguished by different names; and as constitutions have always
some relation to external as well as to domestic circumstances,
the means of benefiting by every change, foreign or domestic,
should be a part of every constitution.
Government ought to be as much open to improvement as any
thing which appertains to man, instead of which it has been mo-
nopolized from age to age, by the most ignorant and vicious of
the human race.'
Let me look now at two possible understandings of constitution-
alism that Marshall's dualism elides (there may well be others).
First is the constitutional practice we have in fact embraced, a prac-
tice as distant from Marshall's insistence on the "original and su-
preme will" as the system of intentional judicial abdication he ex-
plicitly rejects. This practice views the Constitution as a body of
common law, which, like all common law, is changeable by ordi-
nary judicial measures, but which, unlike other common law, is not
changeable by legislative means. How should we evaluate our cur-
rent practices? Although widely accepted as constitutional dogma,
from a contemporary, common law perspective, this constitutional
practice-the judicial development of a body of common law, insu-
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lated against legislative intervention and correction-is odd. Out-
side of the context of constitutional law, we typically think of
judge-made law as democratically acceptable precisely because it is
interstitial and always subject to legislative correction. Without the
potential for legislative intervention, we have, essentially, govern-
ment by precedent rather than government by law. That is true
whether by "law" one means the law as produced by legislators in
ordinary political processes or the extraordinary law as produced
by the "original and supreme will."
And what of "government by precedent?" Some of its benefits
were recited above: evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary
change, the guarantee of equal justice to litigants, and the securing
of decent principles of good governance. For an inventory of the
costs, however, let me return to Paine. Government by precedent,
Paine urged, puts precedent before principle, instills a lazy disre-
gard for current and future necessity, reveals a dangerous lack of
genuine and legitimate law, operates to shield privilege and wealth,
elevates a superstitious regard for the past, and is in practice no
better than, or even all that different from, monarchic arrogance,
whimsy, and unaccountability. " It is, he thought, one of the "vilest
systems that can be set up"'-a severe criticism considering his
contempt for monarchy-and he argued that respect for precedent
would soon be a thing of the past, like the monk's heightened re-
gard for "ancient relics.""1 Ironically, given the way things turned
out, Paine believed this would occur because "government by
precedent," no less than monarchy, was threatened by the renewed
vigor given democracy by the American revolution.92 Indeed, be-
cause precedent has none of the legitimacy or critical reflection or
intelligence of democratically derived legislation, Paine contrasted
it with "true law."93 Precedent was everything law was not; it quite
clearly was not that which should be king in America. Consider the
following passage from the Rights of Man, Part Two:
9 Id. at 583-84.
9o Id. at 583.
91 Id.
92 Id.
9' Id. at 584.
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Almost every case now must be determined by some prece-
dent, be that precedent good or bad, or whether it properly ap-
plies or not; and the practice is become so general, as to suggest a
suspicion, that it proceeds from a deeper policy than at first sight
appears.
Since the revolution of America,... this preaching up the doc-
trine of precedents, drawn from times and circumstances antece-
dent to those events, has been the studied practice of the English
government. The generality of those precedents are founded on
principles and opinions, the reverse of what they ought; and the
greater distance of time they are drawn from, the more they are
to be suspected. But by associating those precedents with a su-
perstitious reverence for ancient things, as monks shew [sic] rel-
ics and call them holy, the generality of mankind are deceived
into the design. Governments now act as if they were afraid to
awaken a single reflection in man. They are softly leading him to
the sepulchre of precedents, to deaden his faculties and call his
attention from the scene of revolutions. They feel that he is arriv-
ing at knowledge faster than they wish, and their policy of prece-
dents is the barometer of their fears. This political popery, like
the ecclesiastical popery of old, has had its day, and is hastening
to its exit. The ragged relic and the antiquated precedent, the
monk and the monarch, will moulder together.
Government by precedent, without any regard to the principle
of the precedent, is one of the vilest systems that can be set up. In
numerous instances, the precedent ought to operate as a warn-
ing, and not as an example, and requires to be shunned instead of
imitated; but instead of this, precedents are taken in the lump,
and put at once for constitution and for law.
Either the doctrine of precedents is policy to keep man in a
state of ignorance, or it is a practical confession that wisdom de-
generates in governments as governments increase in age, and
can only hobble along by the stilts and crutches of precedents.
How is it that the same persons who would proudly be thought
wiser than their predecessors, appear at the same time only as
the ghosts of departed wisdom? How strangely is antiquity
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treated! To answer some purposes it is spoken of as the times of
darkness and ignorance, and to answer others, it is put for the
light of the world.94
Yet another possibility elided by Marshall's articulation of our
constitutional dilemma is the vision of constitutionalism advocated
by Paine himself: a constitution that operates as the "law for gov-
ernment," not only because it operates as a limit on government,
but also because, like all law, it emanates from politics-that is, in a
regular process from the people and their representatives to assure
that it represents the "original and supreme will" of the people
whose rights it is designed to protect. A constitution, according to
both Paine and Marshall, must operate as a meaningful constraint
on legislators. Paine, Marshall, and modern constitutionalists also
believed that a constitution must be law. But Paine's view of law's
essence was different from that of Marshall and modern commen-
tators. For Paine, a constitution, precisely because it is law, must be
the product of democratic processes and aimed at the common
good. Such a constitution would be consulted, and necessarily in-
terpreted, by legislators when they are determining what the law
shall be, no less than it is consulted by judges in the process of
spelling out what the law is. Under Paine's formulation, legislators
have an obligation to ask what the constitution requires and for-
bids. A particular legislator's interpretation of what the constitu-
tion requires would then be subject to a political as well as a judi-
cial check. And Paine's ideal constitution-located in real time and
produced by real people, not the product of an original and su-
preme anything-would always be subject to democratic revision.
The constitution, so understood, would operate as a law for gov-
ernment, but one that is itself the product of politics, rather than a
restraint upon it. Like all law, this constitution would be respected
precisely for its democratic origins and republican ambition.
III. OUR LOST POPULAR CONSTITUTION
What are the costs of the disappearance from contemporary ju-
dicial consciousness of the populist-legal constitution that Paine
seemingly envisioned? Although perhaps analytically trivial, the
" Id. at 583-84.
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most obvious cost is the loss of any collective memory of that
document as being constructive and constitutive of, and therefore a
proper subject of, representative democracy and republican aspira-
tion. Instead, we have come to think of the Constitution as being
constructive and constitutive of limits on representative democracy
in the name of anti-republican individual rights. The Constitution,
read literally and article by article, is, of course, largely about the
structures of representative democracy.95 Its authors and audience
are the "People." It contains mechanisms for its own amendment. 6
It sets the terms of representative politics.97 Unlike the world Paine
envisioned, however, in the constitutional world we inhabit the
terms of government the Constitution establishes are not them-
selves the subject of politics-representative, populist, democratic,
republican, or otherwise. The mandates that set the terms of de-
mocracy are not themselves democratic choices, and we do not ex-
perience them as such. There is no popular sense of those "consti-
tutional moments" noted in retrospect by constitutional
historians, regardless of whether the workings and machinations
of presidents, Supreme Court justices, and generals eventually re-
veal us to have experienced one.99 We do not live the waves of de-
mocracy envisioned by Paine: regular, popular revisitings of consti-
tutionalism followed by periods of ordinary lawmaking under a
constitution willed by the people. This chasm in our democratic
politics-the absence of constitutionalism as a subject of democ-
9" For a full and important interpretation of the Constitution's structures that puts
representation and relation at the center of the constitutional project rather than at
the periphery, see Nourse, supra note 70.
96U.S. Const. art. V.
Id. art. I, §§ 2-5; id. art. 1I, § 1; id. amends. XII, XIV, § 2, XV, XVII, XIX, XXII,
XXIII, XXIV, XXVI.
98 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations 40-41 (1998).
9 If "constitutional moment" means a time when constitutional distributions of
power are fundamentally altered, we are likely living in one now. The power to de-
clare war has been shifted away from Congress, where it resides under the Article I,
Section 8, clause 11; authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment has shifted
from Congress, where it resides under Section Five of that amendment, to the Court;
and the power to interpret the Constitution has shifted from all political actors to the
Court. Yet, if "constitutional moment" means a time of heightened awareness of
deeply political governance issues, we clearly are not living in such a moment. Per-
haps, oxymoronically, we are sleepwalking through a constitutional moment. Maybe
that state of affairs itself qualifies as a constitutional moment: Constitutional govern-
ance undergoes significant transformation with little popular awareness of the change.
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racy-is such a part of the white noise of American political life
that for the most part we do not notice it. We do indeed have occa-
sional convulsive moments of constitutional recrafting, such as the
era that produced the Reconstruction Amendments, and we have
experienced fringe movements, such as today's thankfully dwin-
dling militia movements, that take seriously the idea of constitu-
tionalism as something that ought to be the subject of politics."
Otherwise, there is no consciousness of constitutionalism as some-
thing that can and should be the subject of regular democratic
change, nor is there agitation for the creation of mechanisms that
would make such change a reality. And there is no sense that any
of this is problematic.
Nevertheless, it is problematic. The problem is not simply that
by virtue of judicial review the perennial subjects of judicial review
have been taken off the political table-the constitutionality of
prohibitions on abortion, for example, or gun control, or patterns
of racial segregation, or affirmative action, or open trials for sus-
pected terrorists, and so on. The problem is that the terms of con-
stitutionalism, and hence the terms of democracy, have disap-
peared as subjects of politics. Why is there not, for example, an
urban-based movement to eradicate the heightened representation
of sparsely populated parts of the country occasioned by our bi-
cameral system of unequal representation? Why do "We the Peo-
ple" silently tolerate the electoral college a scant two years after an
election that gave us a vote-loser as president? Why is there not a
movement afoot to use the amendment process to secure in the
constitutional text meaningful campaign finance regulation? Why
are only a handful of prominent constitutional scholars interested
in the problem of the structurally disproportionate representation
of groups once called "suspect classifications ..... while scores of
scholars are interested in the possibility of protecting those groups
through the even more grotesquely disproportionate judicial
" Leanora Minai, Hickory Farms manager led double life, authorities say, St. Pe-
tersburg Times, Dec. 10, 1999, at lB.
101 That handful now includes Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a
Progressive Constitution, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2007 (2001); Lani Guinier, Supreme
Democracy: Bush v. Gore Redux, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 23 (2002); and Nourse, supra
note 70.
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branch?1 12 Constitutional clauses that do not touch directly on the
terms of representative democracy might likewise be viewed as the
subject of, rather than the limit on, democratic discourse. Why is
there not a movement simply to repeal the Second Amendment if
it is true, as seems likely, that gun culture interferes with political
participation? 3 We consider amendments to render criminal the
burning of the American flag; why are we not also considering
amendments to protect reproductive choice"M or reverse Washing-
ton v. Davis,'5 and Bowers v. Hardwick,"° all of which might make
the exercises of democracy more meaningful to huge numbers of
citizens? Why do so many liberal constitutional theorists persist in
thinking that an affliction dubbed "Amendmentitis,"'' 7 not the ab-
... This scholarship has its roots in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), suggesting the need for heightened scrutiny of
legislation affecting discrete and insular minorities, which might not be able to influ-
ence the legislative process to a degree commensurate with their numbers. The schol-
arly literature on constitutional review as a means of protecting minorities is too vast
to cite, but perhaps the strongest, as well as the most consistent and influential, such
theory is the representation-reinforcement model set forth by John Hart Ely, Democ-
racy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 87-104 (1980).
103 Representative Major Owens (D-N.Y.) authored a repeal of the amendment, but
his proposal has not gone further. See Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional
False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 57,
111-12 (1995).
10 This is mentioned in passing by Rachael N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a
Future for Reproductive Liberty: Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407,462 n.247 (1992).
... 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a facially neutral statute was not applied so as
to invidiously discriminate against police recruits on basis of race). A constitutional
amendment reversing Davis in effect would require Congress to consider the dispro-
portionate and adverse impact on racial minorities of facially race-neutral legislation.
This could in turn lead to a substantial advance in racial equality.
106 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of a state statute crimi-
nalizing sodomy because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
not deemed to create a fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sod-
omy even in a private home). During the editing of this Article, Bowers was overruled
in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). Whether this judicial act turns out to be
the beginning of a new civil rights era or a pyrrhic victory prompting a backlash
against "judicial activism" and same-sex marriage is very much an open question. A
popular constitutional approach, although politically difficult, if won, would not have
carried the risk of popular backlash.
..
7 The word is Dean Kathleen Sullivan's, by which she refers to an unhealthy desire
to amend the Constitution. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, Am.
Prospect, Fall 1995, at 20. For a critique of Professor Sullivan's argument, and a cri-
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sence of serious political discussion of the constitutional terms of
our democracy, is crippling contemporary America?
Second, the loss of a Painean populist-legal constitution has fos-
tered a lack of appreciation for the character and virtue of what I
will call the constitutional legislator-the legislator whose under-
standing of the political work of legislating is structured, con-
strained, and guided by his understanding of law and the Constitu-
tion. The absence of such a legislator from our contemporary
constitutional consciousness is all the more striking given our
heightened consciousness of his judicial counterpart, the politically
minded judge. From the time of the realists through the advent and
departure of the critical legal studies movement, we have become
accustomed to the "legislative judge": the judge whose understand-
ing of adjudication is structured by his or her sense of politics, pub-
lic policy, or, more loosely, the quasi-legislative consequences of
judicial decisionmaking. It has become a truism since Justice
Holmes first elaborated on the point"' that the judge must be influ-
enced by, and exerts substantial influence upon, "public policy"
and engages in "quasi-legislative" reasoning; this follows inexora-
bly, we now reason, from the impossibility of maintaining any firm
distinction between law and politics. Oddly, however, the seepage
between law and politics has been a decidedly one-way street. We
have not developed a sense of, much less an appreciation for, the
theoretical and actual legal constraints on politics and legislatures
to parallel our appreciation for both the theoretical and real politi-
cal constraints on law and judges. That is, while we now accept that
judges ought to pay some mind to public policy when adjudicating,
we have lost any sense, or indeed never developed any sense, of
what it means for a legislator to heed the dictates or demands of
law when legislating.
This loss may not initially appear to be substantial, particularly if
we take seriously, as I have suggested we should, Paine's anti-
Burkean, anti-common law broadsides. Is it not enough that our
judges are overly beholden to the past? All things considered, is it
tique of the liberal fear of populist constitutional law generally, see Tushnet, supra
note 13, at 175-81.
"0 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 465-66
(1897) (address at the dedication of a new hall at Boston University School of Law on
Jan. 8, 1897), reprinted in 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991, 997-98 (1997).
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not an unqualifiedly good thing that legislators are committed to
the present and the future, attentive to the consequences of deci-
sionmaking and attuned to a vision of the community to be made
through law, rather than to a memory of the past community be-
queathed us by law? Should not politics and legislation-the work
of making law-be centrally about change rather than preservation
of tradition, including the traditions of law?
This distribution of constitutional responsibilities sounds fine,
but only if we steadfastly ignore what we insist upon in other con-
texts: the moral and political dimension of our constitutional law. If
we acknowledge, as we must, the moralistic, principled, and politi-
cal content of our legalistic constitution, and then put our morally
rich constitution on the side of law in a "politics" and "law" divide,
it should be clear that profound social costs stem from the insis-
tence that legislators owe no duty of fidelity to law, particularly
constitutional law, when legislating to change the course of our col-
lective future. The "morality" that has become such a prominent
component of our constitutional law is not ordinary morality; it is
political morality. Consequently our legalistic constitution, much
more than law generally, has become the repository of our most
morally mature and morally enriched political dialogue. To read
any major Supreme Court case of the last fifty years construing the
Constitution is to realize that that body of common law, unlike
other bodies of common law, is the recordation of our somewhat
mythical and historical, and always idealized, communal self-
narrative. It is a legal constitution-a set of positive norms imposed
by courts on recalcitrant legislators-but it is also the moral story
of the nation's legal and political history. It is where our best poli-
tics, understood as the endeavor to rulz in a morally defensible
manner, reside.
As our legal constitution increasingly becomes the sole province
of judges, lawyers, litigants, and commentators, those actors be-
come our true politicians. They are our moral historians, the au-
thors of the political and moral narrative about who we are and
who we should be. At the same time, as we continue to embrace
the claim that constitutional dialogue is the sole province of the ju-
diciary-because it is, after all, law, not politics-our representa-
tive politics, and our representative political realm, become less po-
litical if we understand politics as the domain of moral governance.
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In other words, if we identify the Constitution as the locus of our
highest politics, and the courts as the proper expositors of constitu-
tional values, our true political dialogue takes place only in courts.
Legislatures, by contrast, become the province of interest group
bartering, not politics.
Several examples illustrate this point. Surely, whether states
ought to be allowed to criminalize abortion is a political question,
just as whether abortions are ever morally justifiable or sometimes
morally obligatory are moral questions. But because that question
is also a constitutional-and hence legal-question, the Court has
taken it up, vigorously and not always excellently. Once it is identi-
fied as a legal question committed exclusively to federal courts, the
question-whether states ought to be allowed to criminalize abor-
tion-is removed from public discourse. Political questions with
any moral dimension whatsoever are identified as constitutional
questions and accordingly become questions exclusively within the
province of the federal judiciary.
Whether a state must criminalize, police against, and prosecute
domestic violence likewise sounds like a political question. Do
states owe citizens this protection, or do they not? Should the state
permit family members to subject each other to rule by force? But,
if those questions are also constitutional questions-whether it is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state to fail to crimi-
nalize domestic violence, and if so, whether it is within Congress's
power and duty under Section Five of that amendment to do some-
thing about it-then these political questions become something
that only courts, not legislators or the public, may answer. To put
this more formally, if the Court is the arbiter of "law," the Consti-
tution is a part of "law," and political morality is a part of the Con-
stitution-all relatively unassailable premises-then the Court be-
comes not only the moral arbiter of our law but also the only moral
arbiter of our law and, therefore, the only truly political branch of
government. Morally enriched political discourse becomes the pre-
rogative of no one but judges and justices, their twenty-five-year-
old clerks, a few constitutional lawyers, and a few commentators
for the New York Times. So the great and relatively unremarked-
upon cost of our having deconstitutionalized the legislative task is
that the political branch has lost its political identity because the
Court has usurped it.
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Lost opportunities are another consequence. The constitutional
legislator who felt legally bound to consult the Constitution in leg-
islating would be required to think like a lawyer as well as a legisla-
tor. This ideal-a "legislative lawyer"-carries obvious costs, com-
bining as it does the potential vices of two decidedly unpopular
professions. Ideally, however, and in practice, the constitutional
legislator might absorb some of the virtues (not only the vices) that
accompany a lawyerly mode of being. Being a lawyer virtually by
definition requires an attentiveness and loyalty to certain legal vir-
tues. The "constitutional legislator"-or, in the reverse, the "legis-
lative constitutional lawyer," should it come to be recognized as a
mode of lawyering no less than one of legislating-might generate
meanings of those legalistic virtues that could inform the legislative
rather than the adjudicative arena. Indeed, those virtues might be
worthy ones indeed.
An example that I have elaborated elsewhere might aid in un-
derstanding this distinction." Although subject to a range of possi-
ble interpretations, a respect for "formal equality"-the insistence
that like cases must be treated alike-is now typically understood
within the adjudicative context as resting on one or both of two
moral foundations. First is the liberal or libertarian intuition that,
by deciding cases in this way, courts maximize individual freedom
by rendering the law more certain. The second foundation is the
conservative intuition that, by deciding cases in this way, the courts
actively preserve the community's legal traditions by maintaining
continuity with past rules and institutions.
But the ideal of formal justice, or formal equality, need not only
rest on those foundations. The universally-felt pull of legal jus-
tice-the insistence that like cases be treated alike and that like
groups be treated alike-might also rest on the humanistic and
communitarian moral intuition that human beings are inherently
equal. Treating likes alike, in other words, might be a mandate not
only to render the law certain and to preserve tradition, but also to
accord to all human beings the dignity and respect owed them by
virtue of their humanity. Understood in this way, the mandate of
formal justice might rest on neither libertarian nor traditionalist
'o9See Robin West, Is the Rule of Law Cosmopolitan?, 19 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 259
(2000).
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impulses. Instead, its basis may be the cosmopolitan and universal-
ist conviction that because we share a common humanity, we are
entitled to equal dignity and respect from those who hold lawful
authority over us. This "cosmopolitan" interpretation of the idea of
formal justice clearly gives that mandate meaning in the legislative,
no less than the adjudicative, arena. It commits the representative,
like the judge, to the project of equal treatment of all persons on
the grounds that the quality of humanity necessitates such treat-
ment. It accordingly expands the universe of those entitled to equal
treatment by legislative acts and adjudicated decisions to the com-
munity of all persons-not just the "community" of litigants situ-
ated comparably to past litigants raising similar claims.
The most serious cost of the disappearance of the populist con-
stitution trumpeted by Paine, however, is that we have lost all
sense of what is required by what might be called our "affirmative
constitution": those parts of our Constitution that require the state
to take certain action. We have become accustomed to thinking of
our Constitution as one that forbids the state from doing many
things but requires of it almost nothing. Paine's constitution, which
is directed to government, invoked by legislators debating the mer-
its of proposed ordinary law, and turned to by legislators when de-
ciding what shall be the law, embraces the possibility of affirmative
constitutional necessity-"thou shalts"-as well as of constitutional
restraint-"thou shalt nots." The legislator, in deciding what is to
be the law, might examine the Constitution not only to discover
what is forbidden, but also what is required; to ascertain what he
must do, as well as what he must refrain from doing. A court, lim-
ited to the work of striking state actions that violate constitutional
norms, will never have occasion to address constitutional lapses of
affirmative duty.' °
A number of interrelated casualties have resulted from this
death of the affirmative constitution. Two are worth mentioning.
First, as a consequence of this loss, the very state action that might
address the most unjust conditions in what we today call the pri-
vate realm, but which we might once have called the "state of na-
... The point was first noted by Professor Lawrence G. Sager in his influential article
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 1212, 1263-64 (1978).
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ture," seems lacking not only in urgency, but also in constitutional
legitimacy."' We have lost a sense of the Constitution, and the rai-
son d'etre of the state, and the essence of law as responding to the
problem posed by the maldistribution and misuse of private power.
We have accordingly lost all sense of the demands of justice-not
just charity-for state intervention into those spheres of private
exploitation. As a result, we have misread a vital part of the mes-
sage of classical liberalism: the Hobbesian understanding of law
and the rule of law as that which deters, punishes, and controls pri-
vate violence and violation. Rather, we increasingly view the con-
structed, public state, rather than the private state of nature, as that
which needs to be constrained through the processes of law. This
loss results in part from our commitment to a constitution that is
understood to be "law" and read as relentlessly limiting state
power and state action, rather than, as the text surely supports, a
constitution that at times limits the power of states, and at other
times requires that they act in response to private injustice, private
oppression, and private violence.
Second, we have lost our sense of the political state, and of our-
selves as political actors, as entities with a human potential for no-
bility rather than debasement. This loss, too, is attributable in part
to our insistence on reading our own Constitution as expressive of
nothing but an urge to limit, separate, counter, and compromise,
rather than as a document facilitating, inspiring, or demanding po-
litical action. We have, in short, identified our Constitution as law,
defined law as uncompromisingly opposed to politics and the state,
and then identified our Constitution, rather than our politics, as
expressive of our political morality. The result is syllogistic: Our
political morality, such as it is, envisions politics as the problem
rather than the solution; we view the products of representative
democracy as driven by irrational and whimsical inclinations that
.. Thus, almost no one argues today that a state is constitutionally required to ad-
dress the welfare of citizens through affirmative actions, although it was not always so.
See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View
of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973). The Lochner era, of
course, infamously stood for the proposition that the Constitution positively forbade
the state from doing so, as such measures required interference with the private
realms of contract and property. See Mark Tushnet & Gary Peller, State Action and a
New Birth of Freedom, 92 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
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must be banished or rationalized through the reasoned, albeit puni-
tive, manipulations of oedipal law.
The most striking cost of our neglect of the affirmative constitu-
tion, however, is the impact on the content of our rights. America
lacks a tradition of constitutionally required, positive rights guaran-
teeing some minimal level of safety, well-being, and welfare to citi-
zens. American constitutional lawyers, judges, and theorists com-
mitted both to constitutionalism and to welfare have been
strikingly incapable of making out a case for the constitutional ne-
cessity of legal regimes that protect the safety, much less the well-
being, of citizens. "2 The reasons for this failure are too many to
catalog here, but one might be our widely shared understanding of
our Constitution as a catalog of rights enforced by nonpolitical
courts against the political branches. Because that is what the Con-
stitution is, its substantive content must lend itself to that arrange-
ment, and the substantive content of our negative rights fits that
conception like a hand in a glove. Negative rights tell the govern-
ment what it cannot do, and the Constitution generally consists of
"thou shalt nots" imposed by courts upon legislatures. By contrast,
positive welfare or security rights are by definition the sorts of
rights that could only be given content by legislative, rather than
adjudicative, action. They tell the legislature what it must do, not
what it may not do. Our judicially enforced, restraining Constitu-
tion and our exclusively negative rights tradition are not traditions
that have simply grown up side by side. They are, rather, two sides
of the same coin.
To complete the metaphor, the "coin" of which negative rights
and negative constitutionalism are two sides is, simply, law. Law, it
,,2 Although there is now a substantial scholarship on the lack of positive welfare
rights in our constitutional jurisprudence, there are very few attempts to actually de-
scribe the possible contours of such rights and their possible textual justification. For
critiques of the state action doctrine, typically understood as foreclosing the existence
of such rights, see Tushnet & Peller, supra note 111. For a critique of the presumed
"negativity" of the American rights tradition, which also undercuts development of
welfare rights, see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L.
Rev. 2271 (1990); Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Lib-
erty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507 (1991). For attempts to de-
lineate the possible textual bases of positive welfare rights, see Frank I. Michelman,
Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 7 (1969); Michelman, supra note 111; Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the
Good Society, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1901 (2001).
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is more or less agreed, is by definition that which courts enforce. '1 3
Law-in its loftiest incarnations-is also that which restrains and
constrains politics. The Constitution, being law, is enforced by
courts and restrains and constrains politics on moral grounds.
Rights, being a part of law and of constitutional law, then, must be
legal constraints, morally grounded and enforced by nonpolitical
courts against political actors. This modern understanding leaves
no room for affirmative rights, whether understood as rights to
welfare, jobs, labor, personal security, or other basic necessities.
Affirmative rights would tell legislators what they must do, as a
matter of law and of constitutional duty. At root, our understand-
ing of law as that which courts enforce and which restrains politics
has dictated our understanding of the content of our Constitution
and the meaning of the rights it indisputably contains.
Thus, it is no mere coincidence that Tom Paine, who held a
fundamentally different jurisprudential conception of law's essence
and a fundamentally different political conception of constitutions
than do we, also held a sharply contrasting conception of the na-
ture of the rights of man for which he so fervently campaigned. Nor
is it a coincidence that Paine's constitutionalism, unlike Marshall's
and our own, lends itself readily to the promotion and protection
of the positive rights of man. As noted above, "law," as Paine con-
sidered it, is not "that which courts enforce," although ordinary
law, created by legislatures, is directed to courts for its enforce-
ment.' And the constitution, although "law," is "directed to" the
government, to be applied by the government, and to be changed
in regular processes by the people. "5 The identification of the con-
stitution as "law" thus does not necessarily imply judicial enforce-
ment, exclusive or otherwise, and it does not imply a body of
norms to be applied by courts. It most certainly does not mean that
courts are to operate as a moral check on politics. Rather, the iden-
"'See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). The realists
magnified even further the role of courts, arguing that the law is that which the courts
produce, and that rules of law are those that courts apply. See John Chipman Gray,
The Nature and Sources of the Law 113-25 (Roland Gray ed., Macmillan Co. 1931)
(1909).
": Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 468.
'1 See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
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tification of the constitution as "law" implies and restates its de-
mocratic origin and republican aspirations. The constitution serves
both as a law mandating what a legislator must do, as well as a law
mandating what a legislator may not do. Hence, it can function as a
legal authority both for the legislator determining what the law
shall be and for the adjudicator determining what the law is. Such a
constitutional world allows room for negative, as well as affirma-
tive, constitutional rights. The identification of a right as constitu-
tional marks it as law-legally obligating somebody to do some-
thing or to refrain from doing something-but not as something
which courts enforce to constrain the reach of politics.
Recall that some of the rights of man for which Paine argued
were indisputably positive, just as others were undeniably negative.
Paine makes this explicit in his discussion of the difference be-
tween those natural rights that are retained by individuals after en-
tering civil society and those rights, like that of self-protection, that
are regulated by the state. '6 In a typical passage of Rights of Man,
the substance of which Paine repeats elsewhere for emphasis, he
explains:
Natural rights are those which appertain to man in right of his
existence.... Civil rights are those which appertain to man in
right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its
foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but
to which his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently
competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and
protection.
The natural rights which he retains, [after entering into civil
society] are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect
in the individual as the right itself. Among this class.., are all
the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind: consequently, relig-
ion is one of those rights. The natural rights which are not re-
tained, are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the
individual, the power to execute them is defective.... A man, by
Paine, Rights of Man, Part One, supra note 2, at 464-65.
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natural right, has a right to judge in his own cause; and so far as
the right of the mind is concerned, he never surrenders it: But
what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redress? He
therefore deposits this right in the common stock of society, and
takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in preference and
in addition to his own....
[C]ivil power, properly considered as such, is made up of the
aggregate of that class of the natural rights of man, which be-
comes defective in the individual in point of power, and answers
not his purpose; but when collected to a focus, becomes compe-
tent to the purpose of every one."7
Paine drew from this the inference that the state has an obliga-
tion, not just the power, to legislate in a way that guarantees the
minimal welfare of all citizens, particularly the poor and the aged."8
For Paine, this meant that an activist state should oversee the di-
rect repayment to the poor, on a schedule tied to their needs, of
funds sufficient to guarantee their minimal welfare."' In Rights of
Man he laid out, in considerable detail, that schedule. The grounds
for this state obligation, Paine later argued in his short pamphlet
Agrarian Justice, were decidedly not charity.2° Rather, he thought
that the condition of the poor, at least in England, was directly at-
tributable to the corruption and self-serving nature of aristocratic
and monarchic government. Because English government was so
profoundly antidemocratic, it had unconscionably exploited the
poor, primarily through regressive taxation.'2 ' Repayment to the
poor through tax rebates thus should be understood as their right.
Indeed, it should be understood as among the rights of man:
117 Id.
Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 604-57.
"' Id. at 624-27.
20 Tom Paine, Agrarian Justice, in Collected Writings, supra note 1, at 405-06
[hereinafter Paine, Agrarian Justice].
121 Id. at 406-11; see also Paine, Agrarian Justice, supra note 120, at 400-01 (decry-
ing the landed monopoly); Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 605-25
(discussing "defects of the English government," taxes generally, and the poor tax).
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Civil government does not consist in executions; but in making
that provision for the instruction of youth, and the support of
age, as to exclude, as much as possible, profligacy from the one,
and despair from the other. Instead of this, the resources of a
country are lavished upon kings, upon courts, upon hirelings, im-
posters, and prostitutes; and even the poor themselves, with all
their wants upon them, are compelled to support the fraud that
oppresses them....
It is the nature of compassion to associate with misfortune. In
taking up this subject I seek no recompence-I fear no conse-
quence. Fortified with that proud integrity, that disdains to tri-
umph or to yield, I will advocate the Rights of Man.'
Just prior to his death, in the pamphlet Agrarian Justice, Paine
went considerably further, both in theory and in advocacy, urging
the creation of a common fund from which every person, upon
reaching the age of twenty-one, would receive a "stakeholder"-
style payment, so as to ameliorate the condition of man.'23 By the
time he wrote Agrarian Justice, Paine's basic intuition had evolved
considerably from that spelled out in Rights of Man. Economic in-
justice, Paine argued, was not solely due to corrupt civil govern-
ment. As he eventually came to see it, the problem was that al-
though some people benefit, and hugely, from the transition from
the state of nature to civilization, many are made miserable by the
same transition.2 ' The cultivation of nature and society, through
the ownership and use of land, that is essential for the advance-
ment of civilization deprives the inhabitants of the natural world of
their right: the use of the land for their support and well-being. As
a consequence, the transition to civilization-of which private
property is a central and necessary institution-itself causes a dep-
rivation of right.'25 The transition enhances the lives of many
through the advent of culture and civility, but it leaves at least as
:22 Paine, Rights of Man, Part Two, supra note 2, at 604.
23 Paine, Agrarian Justice, supra note 120, at 400-11.
124 Id. at 398-401.
125 Id. at 400.
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many worse off than they would have been in the state of nature. '26
These unequal effects, Paine argued, are contrary to justice, and
compensation ought to be paid. Paine summarizes his case for the
stakeholder society thusly:
Cultivation is, at least, one of the greatest natural improve-
ments ever made by human invention. It has given to created
earth a ten-fold value. But the landed monopoly, that began with
it, has produced the greatest evil. It has dispossessed more than
half the inhabitants of every nation of their natural inheritance,
without providing for them, as ought to have been done, as an
indemnification for that loss, and has thereby created a species of
poverty and wretchedness, that did not exist before.
In advocating the case of the persons thus dispossessed, it is a
right and not a charity that I am pleading for. But it is that kind
of right which, being neglected at first, could not be brought for-
ward afterwards, till heaven had opened the way by a revolution
in the system of government. Let us then do honour to revolu-
tions by justice, and give currency to their principles by bless-
ings.
127
CONCLUSION
We have largely abandoned Paine's constitution, as well as his
generous understanding of the rights of man. We do not have a
constitution directed at legislatures rather than courts, enforced
through legislative fealty and regularly amended through popular,
representative politics. Nor do we have a rights tradition that com-
pensates the losses sustained by those who have been hurt, rather
than benefited, by the processes of privatization and civilization,
that protects the weak against the overreaching of the strong, or
that assures direct payments to the poor of monies taken from the
public purse. None of this had to be. The Constitution is as silent
on the question of legislative review as it is on the question of judi-
cial review. Our amendment process could be used, rather than ig-
nored, to keep the Constitution reflective of political will. Legisla-
126 Id.
127Id.
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tors could assume obligations implicitly and explicitly imposed
upon them for the protection of constitutional values. Likewise,
our "rights tradition," particularly if we date it from the time of the
Reconstruction Amendments, can be read to include a case for the
positive rights of welfare, security, and protection against private
violence, as a number of commentators have argued. 2'
The difficulty in locating those rights within our constitutional
history is not that they cannot be found in the Constitution's text,
or do not follow from precedent, or cannot be pegged to significant
constitutional events. Instead, it may be that our loss of Paine's
constitution and our inability to develop the most generous under-
standing of our rights tradition are connected phenomena. The dif-
ficulty we have in locating positive rights within our constitutional
history might in part result from a deeper loss: our lost sense of the
Constitution as a law for governors that emanates directly from the
will of the people rather than from the interpretive prowess of apo-
litical courts-a law that keeps the legislator's feet to the fire, tells
the governor toward what republican ends he should be governing,
and directs both toward justice and the good of the community
rather than toward political gain. To return to Paine's remarkable
advocacy, it may well be that only by recapturing the idea of the
Constitution as a "law for governors" rather than a "law for
courts" will we be able to give legislative content to his much loved
"rights of man." Finally, that may also be the only way for us to
understand those rights in the expansive and generous way he
would have wished, including a right of compensation for the un-
equal losses that result from entering a regime of private property.
To recapture Paine's idea of the Constitution, however, we will
also have to recapture what was most natural for him: a jurispru-
dential conception of law as a moral norm of governance, produced
democratically, that guides as well as restrains our chosen gover-
nors. By doing so we may regain more than a sense of why we
might be justified in regarding such law as king. We might also, and
not coincidentally, gain a sense of how to "honour [our American]
revolution[] by justice," and "give currency to [its] principles by
blessings" 2 -through the democratic recognition of constitutional
28 Id. at 400.
129 Id.
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rights to security and well-being. That, it is worth recalling, is
something our revolutionary pamphleteer also exhorted us to do.
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